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Abstract 
 
This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, we develop a new information theory, in 
which it is not a coincidence that information and physical entropy share the same 
mathematical formula. It is an adaptation of mind to help search for resources. We then 
show that psychological patterns either reflect the constraints of physical laws or are 
evolutionary adaptations to efficiently process information and to increase the chance of 
survival in the environment of our evolutionary past. In the second part, we demonstrate 
that the new information theory provides the foundation to understand market behavior. 
One fundamental result from the information theory is that information is costly. In 
general, information with higher value is more costly. Another fundamental result from 
the information theory is that the amount of information one can receive is the amount of 
information generated minus equivocation. The level of equivocation, which is the 
measure of information asymmetry, is determined by the correlation between the source 
of information and the receiver of information. In general, how much information one 
can receive depends on the background knowledge of the receiver. The difference in cost 
different investors are willing to pay for information and the difference in background 
knowledge about a particular information causes the heterogeneity in information 
processing by the investment public, which is the main reason of the price and volume 
patterns observed in the market. Many assumptions in some of the recent models on 
behavioral finance can be derived naturally from this theory. 
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The proliferation of new investment theories suggests that a more fundamental approach 
is necessary. In this paper, we investigate the physical foundation of human mind  and 
develop a new information theory that provides a unified understanding of information 
and physical entropy. This new information theory provides the foundation to understand 
major patterns in asset markets.   
 
There is a growing consensus that security markets are not as efficient as we thought 
before. The inefficiency is generally attributed to behavioral biases of investors.  Since 
many behavioral biases have been documented in the cognitive psychology literature, 
almost any patterns in the financial markets can be linked to one or several of these 
biases.  However, “the potentially boundless set of psychological biases that theorists can 
use to build behavioral models and explain observed phenomena creates the potential for 
‘theory dredging.’” (Chan, Frankel and Kothari, 2002) Furthermore, many theories, while 
consistent with empirical patterns that they are set out to explain, are not consistent with 
other empirical results. For example, while Bloomfield and Hales (2002) find evidence 
supportive of behavioral model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) in a laboratory 
setting, Durham, Hertzel and Martin (2005) find scant evidence that investors behave in 
accordance with the model using market data. The link between behavioral theory and 
investment behavior are often vague. For example, empirical works reveal that small 
investors’ trading activities often hurt their investment return (Hvidkjaer, 2001). This is 
usually thought that small investors are more prone to behavioral biases than 
professionals, who are better trained (Shanthikumar, 2004). Yet some empirical work 
suggests that professionals exhibit some behavioral biases to a greater extent than non-
professionals (Haigh and List, 2005). 
 
Behavioral models often assume some market sectors or activities are irrational while 
other parts are rational. However, they often differ on which part should be considered 
irrational. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a new model on corporate 
mergers. “Mergers in this model are a form of arbitrage by rational managers operating in 
inefficient markets. This theory is in a way the opposite of Roll’s (1986) hubris 
hypothesis of corporate takeovers, in which financial markets are rational, but corporate 
mangers are not. In our theory, managers rationally respond to less-than rational markets” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, p. 297).  
 
In a recent work, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) questioned whether investor 
performance should be interpreted primarily as a behavioral phenomenon or information-
driven. They conclude, at least in their sample, that information is the primary reason of 
investment performance. Empirical results also suggest that superior performance of 
investors trading local securities and geographically proximate analysts is due to an 
information advantage over others (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Malloy, 2005). 
Kacpercyzk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) documented that, mutual funds whose portfolios 
are highly concentrated in industries where the fund managers have informational 
advantages perform better than mutual funds with well-diversified portfolios. The 
empirical evidences suggest we should explore an information based theory of market 
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behavior. However, “theory offers little guidance in identifying informed investors and in 
distinguishing between securities with scarce information and those with widely available 
information” (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).  
 
The standard economic theory of information was developed by Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980). This theory is based on rational expectation. It assumes that investors can 
accurately assess the value of some information and pay some fixed amount accordingly 
to obtain the information. Recently, various models relax the rational expectation 
assumption to explain major market patterns. Most of these models rely on some kind of 
human psychological biases. The flourishing of behavioral models and interpretations 
suggests that a more fundamental theory is needed.  
 
The basic problem of Grossman and Stiglitz theory is that it does not actually model how 
human beings process information. More than fifty years ago, Shannon (1948) developed 
the entropy theory of information. The major advantage of Shannon’s theory is that it can 
determine how much information a communication system can receive from the source of 
information. Recently, a new theory of information was developed to expand Shannon’s 
entropy theory of information into an economic theory (Chen, 2003, 2005). The basic 
idea of this theory is to assert that information is the reduction of entropy, not only in a 
mathematical sense, as in Shannon’s theory, but also in a physical sense. The physical 
cost of information is highly correlated with economic cost of information. The rules of 
information transmission developed in Shannon’s theory, as mathematical rules, apply 
not only to communication systems, but also to all living organisms, including human 
beings. In this work, we will show how this new information theory can offer “guidance 
in identifying informed investors and in distinguishing between securities with scarce 
information and those with widely available information” and provides a unified 
understanding of observed market behaviors documented in increasingly abundant 
empirical works.   
 
Several important properties can be derived from this new information theory. First, 
information with higher value is in general more costly. This is a direct extension from 
Maxwell’s (1871) thought experiment on an intelligent demon.  Second, the amount of 
information one can receive is the amount of information generated minus equivocation. 
The level of equivocation, which is the measure of information asymmetry, is determined 
by the correlation between the source of information and the receiver of information. In 
general, how much information one can receive depends on the background knowledge 
of a person. Therefore the process of understanding information is a process of learning, 
which often takes long time. This result is a direct extension from Shannon’s theory from 
technical communication systems to human cognitive systems. Third, the value of 
information is inversely related to the number of people who understand it. For example, 
an investor who buys the shares of a company before it becomes popular often earns 
higher rate of return than those who buy the shares of the same company when it 
becomes hot. Buffet (2001) once commented, “What the few bought for the right reason 
in 1925, the many bought for the wrong reason in 1929.” At the same time, the value of a 
company’s investment is also affected by how much its competitors understand the 
technology and market potential of a product.  
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After the new information theory is developed, the new theory of investment can be 
simplied stated as the following: 
 
Major patterns in asset markets are the result of information processing by the 
heterogeneous investment public. 
 
Later, we will discuss detailed theoretical predictions and empirical evidences of this 
theory. 
 
As the efficient market theory retreats, many new theories have emerged and more new 
theories will emerge to fill the void left behind. With so many new theories around, it is 
time to consider criteria for a good theory.  
 
First, a good theory should be consistent with empirical evidences. Not so long ago, 
empirical works on market behavior were so few that it was very difficult to distinguish 
the validity of different theories. In the past several years, however, we witness the 
emergence of a growing number of empirical works, which often call into the question of 
the ability of existing behavioral theories in explaining broader sets of empirical patterns. 
In this work, we will list these empirical results and show how the new information 
theory can provide a simple and unified understanding of the empirical patterns. This 
theory will resolve some puzzles about the market patterns raised in the recent literature 
that could not be answered by existing theoretical frameworks.  
 
Second, a good theory should provide more precise predictive power than the existing 
theories.  Kahneman and Tversky’s  prospect theory is an improvement over Simon’s 
bounded rationality theory because it offered some concrete patterns of irrationality 
beyond the general statement of bounded rationality. Empirical evidences indicate that 
the patterns of trading by small, individual investors differ systematically from that by 
large, institutional investors. Yet the existing behavioral theories do not offer any 
particular behavioral explanations to this systematic difference (Hvidkjaer, 2001; 
Shanthikumar, 2004). The new information theory, however, provide very precise 
understanding of the systematic differences between trading patterns of large and small 
investors. This information theory states that more valuable information is more costly to 
obtain in general. For large investors, it pays to spend a lot of effort and money to 
research the fundamentals. For small investors, it doesn’t pay to dig into the 
fundamentals. They depend on processed and easy to understand information that is 
readily available at low cost, such as news from popular media and price movement of 
the shares. In this work, we will show that patterns of returns by small and large investors 
and patterns of return and trading volumes of stocks can be easily understood from this 
information processing perspective.  
 
Third, a good theory should help provide deeper understanding to existing models. For 
example, Hong and Stein’s (1999) results are built on three key assumptions. The first 
two assumptions are that traders are classified as “newswatchers” and “momentum 
traders” according to their information processing abilities. They commented that, “the 
constraints that we put on traders’ information-processing abilities are arguably not as 
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well-motivated by the experimental psychology literature as the biases in Barberis et al. 
(1998) or Daniel et al. (1998), and so may appear to be more ad hoc” (Hong and Stein, 
1999, p. 2145). These assumptions can actually be derived naturally from this new 
information theory. Depending on the value of assets under management, different 
investors will choose different methods of information gathering with different costs. 
“Newswatchers” are large investors who are willing to pay a high cost to collect private 
information and to make a deep understanding of public information. “Momentum 
traders” are investors who spend less cost or effort on information gathering and rely 
mainly on easy to understand low cost information such as coverage from popular media 
and price momentum signals. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) empirically 
confirm that institutional investors buy on fundamental news while individual investors 
buy on price trends. The third assumption of Hong and Stein (1999) is that private 
information diffuses gradually across the newswatcher population. The gradual diffusion 
of private information means that people gradually learn about the background 
knowledge of information and understand information better over time. This new 
information theory provides clear understanding to all three assumptions in Hong and 
Stein’s model.  
 
Empirical evidences show that patterns in the security markets are mainly driven by 
patterns of information processing by the investment public. However, this does not mean 
that human emotions do not influence market behaviors. It has been shown that most 
psychological patterns either reflect the constraints of physical laws or evolutionary 
adaptation to process information more efficiently in our evolutionary past (Chen, 2003, 
2005). In a word, human emotions are really low cost, but not necessarily unbiased ways 
of information processing. By showing that most patterns in asset markets documented in 
the literature can be explained by this information theory, the focus of attention can be 
directed to search the links between human biases and the phenomena or magnitude of 
phenomena in asset markets that could not be explained by the information theory. 
Furthermore, human activities, including mental activities, are constrained by physical 
laws. These constraints offer initial tests to the plausibility of assumptions in behavioral 
theories. For example, from the information theory, new information can only be 
understood gradually by human beings. If a behavioral theory suggests investors will 
generally overact to new information, we need to examine the empirical evidence with 
great caution.  
 
This paper is an update from earlier works Chen (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I presents the generalized entropy 
theory of information. This information theory provides natural measures of the cost of 
obtaining information and of information asymmetry. It offers a deep connection among 
information, entropy and human mind. Section II shows that entropy theory offers a 
unified understanding of the patterns of human psychology and explains why successful 
investors in one era often perform worse than novice when new industry emerges. 
Section III explains how patterns of investor returns and patterns of security returns and 
trading volumes are natural results of information processing by the heterogeneous 
investment public. It also answers many questions on the gaps between existing 
behavioral theories and empirical evidences. Section IV discusses how this information 
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theory based model of investor behavior is related to other models of behavioral finance. 
Many assumptions in some of the recent theoretical models can be derived naturally from 
the generalized entropy theory of information. Section V concludes.  
 
 
 
I. Entropy, resource, information, and the evolution of mind  
 
 
The value of information is a function of probability and must satisfy the following 
properties:  
 
(a) The information value of two events is higher than the value of each of them. 
(b) If two events are independent, the information value of the two events will be the 
sum of the two.  
(c) The information value of any event is non-negative. 
 
The only mathematical functions that satisfy all the above properties are of the form 
 
   
where H is the value of information, P is the probability associated with a given event 
and b is a positive constant (Applebaum, 1996). Formula (1) represents the level of 
uncertainty. When a signal is received, there is a reduction of uncertainty, which is 
information.  
 
Suppose a random event, X, has n discrete states, x1, x2, …,xn, each with probability p1, p2, 
…,pn. The information value of X is the average of information value of each state, that is 
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The right hand side of (2), which is the entropy function first introduced by Boltzmann in 
the 1870s, is also the general formula for information (Shannon, 1948). 
 
After the entropy theory of information was developed in 1948, its technique has been 
applied to many different problems in economic and finance. (Theil, 1967; Maasoumi 
and Racine, 2002 and many others) However, the standard economic theory of 
information, represented by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) was not built on the foundation 
of entropy theory. Economists often feel that “the well-known Shannon measure which 
has been so useful in communications engineering is not in general appropriate for 
economic analysis because it gives no weight to the value of the information. If 
beforehand a large manufacturer regards it as equally likely whether the price of his 
product will go up or down, then learning which is true conveys no more information, in 
the Shannon sense, than observing the toss of a fair coin.” (Arrow, 1973 (1983), p. 138) 
(1)                                                                                  log)( PPH b−=
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The Shannon measure actually carries weight of information. For example, N symbols 
with identical Shannon measure carry N times more information than a single symbol 
(Shannon, 1948). Similarly, the value of the information about the future price is higher 
to a large manufacturer than to a small manufacturer, other things being equal. 
 
Authorities in information theory also discouraged the application of entropy theory to 
broader areas.  
 
Workers in other fields should realize that that the basic results of the subject are 
aimed at a very specific direction, a direction that is not necessarily relevant to such 
fields as psychology, economics, and other social sciences. Indeed, the hard core of 
information theory is essentially, a branch of mathematics, a strictly deductive system. 
(Shannon, 1956) 
 
This orthodox view was reaffirmed recently: 
 
The efforts of physicists to link information theory more closely to statistical physics 
were less successful. It is true that there are mathematical similarities, and it is true 
that cross pollination has occurred over the years. However, the problem areas being 
modeled by these theories are very different, so it is likely that the coupling remains 
limited.  
 
In the early years after 1948, many people, particularly those in the softer sciences, 
were entranced by the hope of using information theory to bring some mathematical 
structure into their own fields. In many cases, these people did not realize the extent to 
which the definition of information was designed to help the communication engineer 
send messages rather than to help people understand the meaning of messages. In 
some cases, extreme claims were made about the applicability of information theory, 
thus embarrassing serious workers in the field. (Gallager, 2001, p. 2694) 
 
However, the dissonance between entropy function as a mathematical representation of 
information and the practical value of information has long puzzled many people and 
recent works have shown that our intuitive concept of information coincides with the 
mathematical definition of information as entropy (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2004; 
Adami, 2004). In the following we will provide a more formal argument. If some 
decision making process is truly important and is needed again and again in life, it is 
highly economical that quantitative modules to be evolved in the mind to expedite the 
process. For example, predators need routinely to assess their distance from the prey, the 
geometry of the terrain, the speed differential between itself and the prey, the energy cost 
of chasing down its prey, the probability of success of each chase and the amount of 
energy it can obtain from prey to determine whether, when and where to initiate a chase. 
There are many other sophisticated functions, such as navigation by migrating birds over 
long distances, that need sophisticated mathematical capabilities. Many animals need to 
make precise calculations of many of these quantitative problems many times in life. To 
reduce the cost of estimation, mathematical models must have evolved in their mind so 
that many decision making processes are simplified into parameter estimation and 
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numerical computation. It is highly likely that, if some function is very important for the 
survival of the animal, in the process of evolution, this function will be genetically 
assimilated. The nature of the entropy function may be gleaned from the following quote: 
 
The German physicist Rudolf Clausius coined the word “entropy” in 1865. Looking 
for a word similar to the word “energy”, Clausius chose the Greek word “entropy”, 
which means (in Greek) “the turning” or “the transformation.” The coinage is indeed 
apt: if we ask, “which transformation of a system will occur spontaneously?”, then the 
multiplicity of each of the various possible macrostates is crucial, for the system will 
evolve to the macrostate of largest multiplicity. (Baierlein, 1999, p. 34) 
 
More generally, a system has a tendency to move from a state of smaller multiplicity (or 
probability) to a state of larger multiplicity (or probability). This tendency of directional 
movement is the source of useful energy that drives, among other things, the living 
organisms. Since all living organisms need to extract low entropy from the environment 
to compensate continuous dissipation and entropy is the only mathematical function to 
measure scarcity of resources (Chen, 2005), it is inevitable that information, which we 
collect for our survival, is largely about entropy. It is not a mere coincidence that our 
intuitive concept of information and the mathematical definition of information as 
entropy largely overlap. The intuitive concept is really a simplified evaluation of a 
mathematical computation.  
 
If Shannon’s entropy theory of information is purely a mathematical theory with little 
connection with the physical laws, it would be a miracle that information defined as 
entropy turns out to have the magic properties that handle technical problems in 
communication so well. However, once mathematical theories are thought to be a natural 
part of our evolutionary legacy, it would be natural for entropy theory of information to 
possess this property.  
   
From the above discussion, an entropy theory based economic theory of information can 
be simply stated as: 
 
Information is the reduction of entropy, not only in a mathematical sense, as in 
Shannon’s theory, but also in a physical sense. The rules of information transmission 
developed in Shannon’s theory, as mathematical rules, apply not only to 
communication systems, but also to all living organisms.  
 
In the following, we will discuss some distinct properties of this new information theory. 
First, information that is more valuable is in general more expensive to obtain. From the 
second law of thermodynamics, Maxwell (1871) concluded that information of higher 
value is of higher physical cost. Since economic cost is highly correlated to physical cost 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Chen, 2005), more valuable information is in general more 
expensive to obtain.  
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Second, the amount of information one can receive depends on the person’s background 
knowledge about that particular information. The most important result from Shannon’s 
entropy theory of information is the following formula 
 
 
where R is the amount of information one can receive, H is the amount of information a 
source sent and Hy(x), the conditional entropy, is called equivocation. Formula (3) shows 
that the amount of information one can receive would be equal to the amount of 
information sent minus the average rate of conditional entropy. Before Shannon’s theory, 
it was impossible to accurately assess how much information one can receive from an 
information source. In communication theory, this formula is used to discuss how noises 
affect the efficiency of information transmission. But it can be understood from more 
general perspective. The level of conditional entropy Hy(x) is determined by the 
correlation between senders and receivers. When x and y are independent, Hy(x) = H(x) 
and R = 0. No information can be transmitted between two objects that are independent of 
each other. When the correlation of x and y is equal to one, Hy(x) = 0. No information loss 
occurs in transmission. In general, the amount of information one can receive from the 
source depends on the correlation between the two. The higher the correlation between 
the source and receiver, the more information can be transmitted.  
 
The above discussion does not depend on the specific characteristics of senders and 
receivers of information. So it applies to human beings as well as technical 
communication equipments, which are the original focus in information theory in science 
and engineering. However, the laws that govern human activities, including mental 
activities, are the same physical laws that govern non-living systems.  
 
Hy(x) in Formula (3) offers the quantitative measure of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 
1970). Since different people have different background knowledge about the same 
information, heterogeneity of opinion occurs naturally. To understand the value of a new 
product or new production system may take the investment public several years. To fully 
appreciate the scope of some technology change may take several decades. For example, 
the economic and social impacts of cars as personal transportation instruments and 
computers as personal communication instruments were only gradually realized over the 
path of several decades. This is why individual stocks and whole stock markets often 
exhibit cycles of return of different lengths.  This property is very different from 
Grossman-Stiglitz information theory, where economic agents can recognize the value of 
information instantly and pay according to its value.  
 
Third, the same information, when known to more people, becomes less valuable. Figure 
1 is a graph of (1), where H is a function of P, the probability of any given event. From 
Figure 1, value is a decreasing function of probability. In the standard information theory, 
P represents the probability that some event will occur. In this theory, P is generalized to 
represent the percentage of people or money that is controlled by informed investors.   
When P = 1, -log P =0. Thus the value of information that is already known to everyone 
is zero. When P approaches zero, -logP approaches infinity. Therefore, the value of 
(3)                                                                              )()( xHxHR y−=
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information that is known to few is very high. The following example will illustrate this 
point. Figure 2 shows overnight rate of return and trading volume of shares of WestJet, a 
Canadian airline, surrounding the announcement of the bankruptcy of Jetsgo, the main 
competitor of WestJet. Jetsgo announced bankruptcy at the evening of March 10, 2005. If 
one bought stock at March 10, he would have made a return of 40% overnight. Judging 
from the trading volume of March 9, some people did buy WestJet stock before 
information was released to the public. After the announcement made the information 
public, trading volume was very high and the rate of return is near zero. Figure 2 neatly 
illustrates the relation between value of some information and the number of people who 
know the information.  
 
It is often said that the cost of information has dropped sharply over the years. But at the 
same time, the value of the same type of information has dropped sharply as well. 
Information of high value is usually carefully guarded and difficult to detect. For 
example, Warren Buffett, who has a very successful record for gaining and using 
insightful market information, would not announce to the public which stock(s) he is 
going to buy or sell. Animals have discovered this long ago. “In those cases where animal 
signals really are of mutual benefit, they will tend to sink to the level of a conspiratorial 
whisper: indeed this may often have happened, the resulting signals being to 
inconspicuous for us to have noticed them. If signal strength increases over the 
generations this suggests, on the other hand, that there has been increasing resistance on 
the side of the receiver.” (Dawkins, 1999, p. 59) 
 
Unlike Grossman-Stiglitz information theory, this information theory is a non-
equilibrium theory. It does not assume a company possesses some intrinsic value waiting 
to be discovered by the investment public. Instead, the process of understanding the value 
of a company by the investment public is accompanied by the process of understanding 
the technology and market potential by its competitors, which generally reduce the value 
of that particular company. Empirical evidences that we will present later support this 
statement.  
 
Since this new information theory can be applied to much broader fields than Shannon’s 
theory, it may be called the Generalized Entropy Theory of Information.  Empirical 
evidences show that Grossman-Stiglitz information theory cannot explain observed 
investor behaviors (Barber and Odean, 2000). Other models extended from Grossman-
Stiglitz theory often have little explanatory power outside a limited scope. We will show 
later that the generalized entropy theory of information will provide a unified 
understanding of the empirical market behaviors documented in the literature.  
  
 
 
II. The entropy theory of human psychology 
 
 
Human activities, as well as the activities of all organisms, are essentially thermodynamic 
processes, or entropic processes. (Schrodinger, 1944; Wiener, 1948; Prigorgine, 1980) 
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The entropy law, which states that closed systems tend towards states of higher entropy, 
is the most universal law of the nature. From the entropy law, we know that it is far easier 
for a system to disintegrate than to maintain its structure.  (Morowitz, 1992; Margulis, 
1998) So there is a strong selective pressure for important knowledge to become 
genetically coded into heuristic principles to reduce the cost of learning. (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) Natural selection determines that human minds are born with many 
data and preferences stored. (Pinker, 1997) In this section we will show that entropy 
theory offers a unified understanding of some frequently cited patterns of human 
psychology in behavioral finance literature. 
 
1. Conservatism  
 
Conservatism in human beings may be characterized as behavior by individuals who 
possess a reluctance to update their beliefs in the face of new information. This property 
is a natural result from information theory. From (3), the information one can receive is 
information sent minus equivocation, which is reduced gradually as the receiver’s 
background knowledge about the source increases. Hence conservatism reflects the 
gradual reduction of equivocation by the receiver of any given information.  
 
This theory provides a clear link between conservatism and Bayesian updating, which we 
consider rational. From (3), as equivocation approaches to zero, the asymptotic state 
becomes Bayesian estimate.  
 
2. Framing or representativeness 
 
We often frame, or sort problems into categories and assign different associated values 
based on the perceived relative levels of importance of each problem. Why do we do 
this? Apart from the self-evident common sense answer, the following result from 
statistical physics helps answer this question. 
 
If {p1, …pn} and {q1, … qn} are two sets of probabilities, then  
 
(4)                                      )log()log(
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with equality achieved if and only if each  
 
               njpq jj ≤≤= 1                             ,  
 
 
This result is called Gibbs inequality. (Isihara, 1971) In Gibbs inequality, pj can be 
understood as the probability of event j in nature and qj is the subjective probability of 
our assessment of that event. The left hand side of formula (4) is the average uncertainty 
of events and the right hand side is the uncertainty of our subjective assessment of those 
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events. In general, the difference between the left hand side and right hand side of (4) is 
smaller when qj is closer to pj. This means that information processing is more efficient 
when the subjective probabilities are closer to the objective probabilities. Such a 
conclusion makes both common sense and matches our intuition. In particular, a mind 
with stored data about the natural environment is in general more efficient than a 
completely unbiased mind, where all subjective probabilities are to be learned from 
scratch. Natural selection determines that the human mind will evolve so that, “in 
general, instances of large classes are recalled better and faster than instances of less 
frequent classes; that likely occurrences are easier to imagine than unlikely ones; and that 
the associative connections between events are strengthened when the events frequently 
co-occur.” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p.1128)  
 
 Thus, “people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex 
tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In 
general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and 
systematic errors.” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p.1124) What causes these severe and 
systematic errors? Human minds are the result of natural selection, which “operates over 
thousands of generations. For ninety-nine percent of human existence, people lived as 
foragers in small nomadic bands. Our brains are adapted to that long-vanished way of 
life, not to brand-new agriculture and industrial civilizations.” (Pinker, 1997, p. 42) This 
is why we observe systematic errors in judgment by human beings, i.e., the typical 
framework for processing information today was developed over millennia when 
environmental conditions were very different. For example, most of us still have a great 
fear of snakes, although they rarely pose a threat to urban dwellers today. On the other 
hand, fear of electricity has to be instilled into children’s minds with great difficulty. 
(Pinker, 1997)   
 
From Gibbs inequality, the level of uncertainty in understanding a type of events is  
 
                                                      )log(
1
∑
=
−
n
j
jj qp  
 
where pi and qi are objective and subjective probabilities respectively. Suppose this type 
of events has two possible outcomes, state 1 and state2. The probability of state 1 is 90% 
and the probability of state 2 is 10%. An expert on this type of events may correctly 
estimate these probabilities and for her the uncertainty in prediction is  
 
 33.01.0ln1.09.0ln9.0 =−−  
 
 
A novice, who has no priori knowledge on these events, may assign 50% probability to 
each outcome. For her the uncertainty in prediction is 
 
 69.05.0ln1.05.0ln9.0 =−−  
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It is clearly that the expert, who has accumulated knowledge through long time 
experience, has better estimation than novice in a stable environment.  
 
Now assume the environment experiences some fundamental change and the new 
probabilities of state 1 and state 2 become 10% and 90% respectively. This time, the 
uncertainty of the prediction by the expert, who still uses the same probability, is 
 
 08.21.0ln9.09.0ln1.0 =−−  
 
while the uncertainty of prediction by a novice is 
 
 69.05.0ln9.05.0ln1.0 =−−  
 
 
This shows that when environment changes suddenly, novice actually perform better than 
experts, whose priori knowledge often cause severe biases in prediction. This is why 
successful investors cannot eliminate other investors continuously and why financial 
markets will not become progressively more efficient over time. This also explains why 
new industries are often pioneered by newcomers or outsiders. 
 
3. Herd behavior 
 
From the second law of thermodynamics, a random action generally costs more than it 
gains. To concentrate actions into profitable ones, we, like wild animals, often learn from 
the experience of successful individuals and copy their behavior. It is generally very 
costly and impossible to repeat all of the experiences and mistakes that are possible. 
Therefore, we accept certain modes of behavior demonstrated by others without 
completely investigating the reasons behind them. Copying the actions of others directly 
is much easier, i.e., more efficient. Herding mentality developed because it is a cost-
effective way of learning most of the time. That said, herding can be another reason that 
systematic errors in judgment are observable by individuals and societies.  
 
4. Overconfidence and irrationality 
 
“Extensive evidence shows that people are overconfident in their judgments.” (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003)  From entropy law, any biological system, as a non-equilibrium 
system, faces continuous dissipation of energy. Endless efforts are required to maintain a 
non-equilibrium system. Entropy law has been intuitively understood since ancient times. 
“The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, 
whence the stone would fall back of its own weight. They had thought with some reason 
that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labour. … If this myth 
is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. … The workman of today works every day 
in his life at the same tasks and this fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare 
moments when it becomes conscious.” (Camus, 1955, p. 109) In the long course of 
evolution of our solar system, all life on earth will eventually go extinct in the far distant 
future (Lovelock, 1988). From a purely rational perspective, life is meaningless. Since 
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human beings are self-conscious, the very question of why life is worth living lingers in 
many people’s minds.  “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is 
suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the 
fundamental question of philosophy.” (Camus, 1955, p. 11) Overconfidence and 
irrationality are adaptive psychological traits that help us survive in this world. 
 
5. Loss aversion in winning and risk seeking in losses  
 
Human beings often exhibit loss aversion in winning and risk seeking in losses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) collected some responses to hypothetical choice 
problems. In one problem, the subjects were presented with two choices.  
 
Choice A: There is an 80% probability of winning 4000 pounds and a 20% probability of 
winning nothing. 
 
Choice B: There is a certainty of winning 3000 pounds. 
 
The expected end wealth of choice A is 3200 and of choice B is 3000. Most respondents 
chose B, exhibiting loss aversion in winning. When the signs of the outcomes are 
reversed, the problems become the following: 
 
Choice C: There is an 80% probability of losing 4000 pounds and 20% probability of 
losing nothing. 
 
Choice D: There is a certainty of losing 3000 pounds. 
 
The expected end wealth of choice C is -3200 and of choice D is -3000. Most 
respondents chose C, exhibiting risk seeking in losses. As money is a new invention in 
human evolutionary history, the preference for money must be derived from something 
else. Since food is the most important resource of our evolutionary past, our preference 
for wealth is probably derived from our preferences for food.  
 
In the history of human evolution, we have not been able to store large amounts of extra 
food. If one goes without food for several days, he will starve. We translate the monetary 
numbers from the above four questions into days of food to obtain the following. In the 
case of gain, we can think of the choices of two possible strategies. In the first strategy, 
there is an 80% probability of getting food for 40 days and 20% chance of getting 
nothing. In the second strategy, there is a certainty of getting food for 30 days. It is easy 
to see why most people will prefer 30 days of food in certainty over a strategy that 
contains a 20% risk of getting nothing. In the case of loss, we can think of the choices of 
two possible strategies. In the first strategy, there is an 80% probability losing food for 40 
days and a 20% chance of getting nothing for zero day. In the second strategy, there is a 
certainty of getting no food for 30 days. Since 30 days’ without food will represent sure 
death, people will naturally choose a 20% chance of survival. So people consistently 
avoid risk in both positive gain and negative loss. “Risk seeking” in loss is an unfortunate 
terminology borrowed from utility theory.   
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From the above discussion, we find that some psychological patterns, such as 
conservatism, reflect the constraints of thermodynamic laws. Others, such as framing and 
herding, are evolutionary adaptations to enable efficient processing of information, which 
is the reduction of entropy. Still others, such as overconfidence, irrationality and loss 
aversion, are mental attitudes that help us survive the continuous dissipation of energy 
endured by all non-equilibrium systems. Therefore, entropy theory offers a unified 
understanding of human psychology.  
 
In the next section, we will apply the generalized entropy theory of information, a theory 
based on most fundamental physical laws, to understand the patterns in the stock market 
without directly invoking assumptions on human psychology. This will avoid the 
problem of overfitting theories to empirical observation. 
 
  
 
III. Theoretical predictions and empirical evidences 
  
 
A. Differences in informational advantages of investors of different sizes 
 
From this information theory, information with higher value is in general more costly. 
The amount of time and resource an investor will spend depends on the value of her 
portfolio. It can be predicted that the rate of return for large, institutional investors will be 
higher than small, individual investors because large investors will spend more time and 
resources in research. As the market rate of return is the average rate of return of all 
investors, we expect large investors outperform market average and small investors 
underperform market average. This is supported by empirical evidences. (Wermers, 
2000; Barber and Odean, 2000; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004)  
 
If it is not economical for small investors to spend a lot of effort to study individual 
stocks, can they expect superior returns by investing in mutual funds with talented 
managers? The information theory predicts that the value generated by the talented 
managers will be mainly retained by the managers, who spend time to collect and analyze 
information, and not be distributed to mutual fund investors. Wermers (2000) 
documented that during the 1977 to 1994 period, mutual funds did generate higher raw 
rate of return than the market indices, which indicates researches by mutual fund 
managers do uncover valuable information. However, the net rate of return to investors is 
an average of 13.3 percent per year, which is the same as the Vanguard fund, the largest 
index fund. As the average transaction costs decrease over the years, average expense 
ratios increase, making the sum of these two costs remaining relatively constant over the 
years. (Wermers, 2000) This shows that it is the mutual fund managers, not the average 
investors, who capture the benefit of declining transaction costs. This is consistent with 
the model of Berk and Green (2004), where mutual fund managers capture the entire 
rents from their performance. In essence, for small investors without special information 
advantage or people whose cost of collecting and analyzing information outweighs its 
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benefit, which are the majority of the population, they cannot expect a higher rate of 
return on stocks than the general market. The above result may be called the generalized 
efficient market hypothesis: investors without informational advantage can not 
outperform the general market.  
 
Odean (1999) documented that the shares individual investors sold outperform the shares 
they bought. He attributed this to some unknown biases of investors’ judgment and 
stated, “What is more certain is that these investors do have useful information which 
they are somehow misinterpreting.” (Odean, 1999, p. 1296) The real reason may be a lot 
simpler. Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) documented that shares bought by mutual 
fund managers outperform shares they sold. The differential performance of shares 
bought and sold by individual investors is partly due to informational advantages of some 
of their trading counterparties. Even if individual investors randomly select buy and sell 
orders, most trades that get executed are not in their favor, because some of their 
counterparties, such as mutual fund managers, possess valuable information and select to 
fill the orders that are in their favor. For example, if an individual investor randomly 
select two stocks to sell with limit orders, it is more likely that the stock which will have 
a higher rate of return in the future will be bought by more informed investors. Later, we 
will demonstrate that small investors’ dependence on low cost, low value information 
does make them prone to bad trading decisions.  
 
Barber and Odean (2000) documented that there is very little difference in the gross 
performance of households that trade frequently and those that trade infrequently. On 
average, shares individual investors sold outperform the shares they bought. (Odean, 
1999) If all else are same, more frequently traded investors should earn lower rate of 
gross return. So this indicates that more frequently traded investors have better 
investment skills than less frequently traded investors. This prediction can be directly 
verified from trading records. Barber and Odean cited Carhart (1997) to show that 
frequent trading also hurts the performance of mutual funds. However, a more recent and 
more detailed study by Wermers (2000) shows that the most traded mutual funds 
outperform least traded mutual funds by a wide margin. Barber and Odean attribute 
trading activities to overconfidence, a behavioral explanation. It may be simpler and more 
consistent with empirical evidences to explain trading as a type of learning activity. Like 
all other kinds of learning, trading is costly. The cost of learning is compensated, at least 
partially, by knowledge gained from the experience. 
 
  
B. Differences in informational advantages of investors of different backgrounds 
 
From (3), the ability to understand information depends on the background knowledge of 
investors. This indicates that investors will earn higher rate of return if they choose to 
invest in securities that they are familiar with. This is supported by some recent empirical 
investigations. Professional managers’ and individual investors’ local investments 
outperform their remote investments. (Coval and Moskwitz, 2001; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, 2005) Malloy (2005) provides evidence that local analysts are significantly 
more accurate than other analysts in forecasting and recommendations.  Mutual funds 
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with high industry concentration, where fund managers can focus on particular industries 
they are familiar with, are more successful in selecting securities than diversified funds. 
(Kacpercyzk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005) Investors take longer time to understand 
information from sources they are less familiar with. Hong, Lim and Stein (2001) 
empirically confirm that information from small firms, from firms with low analyst 
coverage and from firms with bad news, which managers are reluctant to release, 
generally diffuse slower. From Hvidkjaer (2001), the selling pressures on losers generally 
are stronger and last much longer than buying pressures on winners, suggesting 
information processing is less efficient on bad news.   
  
Since insiders understand information much better than others, they can and will take 
advantage of this information asymmetry to pursue certain corporate activities. Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003) develop a new model on corporate mergers, in which mergers are a 
form of arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient markets.  They show that 
their model has better explanatory power than the behavioral based models and is 
supported by new empirical evidences. (Ang and Zheng, 2002) While assuming 
managers are rational, they continue to assume financial markets are less-than-rational. 
However, form the information theory, there is no need to assume financial markets are 
less-than-rational. In the next subsection, we will show how information processing by 
investors of different sizes with different background knowledge will generate cycles of 
undervaluation and overvaluation.  
  
 
C. Information processing by heterogeneous investors  and market patterns 
 
 
A persistent pattern in the security market is the price continuation in short to medium 
run and the reversal of return in the long run. (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993) Several models have been developed to explain this pattern. (Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny,1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam,1998; Hong and 
stein,1999) However, these models are based on some ad hoc assumptions and could not 
explain other patterns. (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Hvidkjaer, 2001) For example, the 
return patterns are often accompanied by distinct patterns of trading volume. However, 
“existing theories of investor behavior do not fully account for all of the evidence. … 
none of these models incorporate trading volume explicitly and, therefore, they cannot 
fully explain why trading volume is able to predict the magnitude and persistence of 
future price momentum.” (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, p. 2066)  
 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Hvidkjaer (2001) presented many empirical results 
regarding return, trading volume and patterns of investment decisions by traders of 
different sizes. Many of these results, especially those in Hvidkjaer (2001), are not 
presented in a systematic way because of the lack of a proper theoretical framework. In 
the following, we will show how the generalized entropy theory of information offers a 
coherent and comprehensive understanding of observed market patterns and the 
underlying dynamics. Hvidkjaer’s work has gone through several significant revisions. 
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Our discussion will be based on his new version from July, 2004. This part is mainly 
adapted from Chen (2004).  
 
To an investor, the choice of information gathering is a matter of cost and the ability to 
understand some information depends on her background. More valuable information is 
more costly to obtain in general. For large investors, it pays to spend a lot of effort and 
money to research the fundamentals. For small investors, it doesn’t pay to dig into the 
fundamentals. They depend on processed and easy to understand information that is 
readily available at low cost, such as news from popular media and price movement of 
the shares. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) confirmed that institutional 
investors buy on fundamental news while individual investors buy on price trends. 
Whether an investor will be able to understand certain information also depends on her 
particular background, which determines her level of equivocation in receiving that 
information. Information processing by investors of different sizes with different 
backgrounds will generate the return and trading volume cycle that is similar to Lee and 
Swaminathan’s (2000) momentum life cycle. In the following, we will illustrate the 
patterns of return and trading volumes of a stock of a typical company from the 
information processing perspective.  
 
Suppose a company develop a new technology, which is expected to bring the company 
high profit in the future. From (3), those who are familiar with the technology and 
company will have low equivocation in receiving the information. They understand the 
significance of the information first and buy the company shares. Since they are a small 
number of people, the buying is of low volume. This corresponds to the beginning of the 
low volume winner stage in momentum life cycle. From table IX of Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), the return on equity does improve over the next three years for low 
volume winner, which shows that the investors in this stage do have accurate perception 
about the future.   From Figure 3 of Hvidkjaer (2001), the buying pressures from both 
large trades and small trades in this period trend up gradually, signaling the gradual 
diffusion of information. The buying pressure from large trades are higher than the  
buying pressure from small trades, which shows that large traders as a group are better 
informed than small traders.  
 
As the technology goes through various stages from R&D to production, the potential 
becomes clearer to more people. This means that the level of equivocation gradually 
reduces to more people, which sustains buying interest and share prices increase 
gradually. As the technology becomes adopted in production and profit figures become 
public, the level of equivocation decrease further and the pool of investors increases 
further. Eventually, both the sustained increase of stock price and stable pattern of profit 
increase, which are very easy to understand by the general public, attract large amount of 
buyers, which results in high trading volume and pushes the stock prices further up. This 
corresponds to the high volume winner stage in momentum life cycle. From Figure 2,3 of 
Hvidkjaer (2001), there is a steady and higher buying pressure among large traders than 
in low volume winner stage, signaling a consensus of bullish sentiment from informed 
investors. Because of this consensus, the return of this stage is extremely high. (Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000, Table IV) From Table IX of Lee and Swaminathan (2000), the 
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return on equity is very high for high volume winners. However, the high return of the 
company will attract the attention of not only investors but also competitors, which will 
try to produce same or similar products for this high profit market.  
 
From Figure 1, the value of some information that is known to everyone is zero. As the 
good news reaches most investors, the security is probably already fully or over priced. 
Among the increased pool of investors, more and more investors understand very little of 
the fundamentals behind the technology and depend on easy to understand signals such as 
coverage from popular media and stock price movement to make trading decisions. For 
this group of investors, they will stop buying only when the opinion of public media 
changes and the trend of price increase reverses significantly. As stock price keeps 
increasing, momentum trading becomes highly profitable, which will eventually push the 
share prices higher than the fundamental value.  Since large investors spend more 
resources in investment, they are generally better informed than small investors. As share 
prices become highly overvalued relative to fundamentals, large investors start to unload 
positions while small investors keep buying. As the selling pressure from large investors 
becomes greater than the buying pressure from small investors, the trend of price increase 
reverses to price decrease. (Hvidkjaer, 2001, Figure 2)   This is the period of high volume 
losers in momentum life cycle. In the period of high volume loser, as competition 
intensifies, return on equity drops sharply from previous years. (Lee and Swaminathan, 
2000, Table IX).  
 
As the pattern of price drop becomes clear, more and more people joined the selling. 
After large investors and some of the small investors have finished unloading the 
positions, the volume of trading will decline, which is the period of low volume loser in 
momentum life cycle. This period is characterized by active selling of small investor. 
(Hvidkjaer, 2001) Since small investors are typically slow to understand information, 
their active selling, after the selling by large investors, signals the selling is overextended, 
which indicates the low volume losers will rebound and earn high future return in 
general. From the operation point of view, this is the worst time for the company. 
Overcapacity of a once high profit margin industry pushes down the return on equity 
further from the high volume loser stage. There are probably some layoffs of labor and 
write off of capital. But the return on equity will gradually regress toward normal level. 
(Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Table IX).   
 
The above paragraphs describe the patterns of information processing and trading when 
the initial news is positive. When the news is negative, a similar pattern exists at opposite 
directions. Since there is a cost shorting stocks and there are many institutional 
constraints on shorting stocks, short selling is much more difficult than buying stocks. 
With good news, there are many potential buyers. With a bad news, the sellers are largely 
confined to existing share holders. So overreaction is less strong on bad news. The 
statistical results, which are the average of all phenomena, mainly reflect the action from 
good news instead of bad news. With this observation in mind, we can discuss the 
following:  
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“The Hong and Stein (1999) model predicts that momentum profit should be larger for 
stocks with slower information diffusion. If we make the assumption that scarcity of 
trading leads to insufficient diffusion of information, then the Hong and Stein model 
would predict a greater momentum effect among low volume stocks. Our result indicate 
this to be true among winners but not among losers. That is, low volume winners have 
greater momentum, but low volume losers actually have less momentum.” (Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000, p. 2062) 
 
The information theory indicates that low trading volume may reflect either a lack of 
understanding of some new information or a lack of information. From the above 
discussion, there are two types of low volume losers. The first, which is an average 
representative from Lee and Swaminathan’s statistical results, is part of a cycle that is 
triggered by some good news. It has experienced the cycle of low volume winner, high 
volume winner, high volume loser and low volume loser. The low volume loser period 
represents the end of an information processing cycle. This is why it exhibits less 
momentum. The other type is the low volume loser period at the beginning of an 
information processing cycle that is triggered by a bad news. (Hong, Lim and Stein, 
2001) These low volume losers do exhibit strong momentum in low rate of return. So the 
apparent inconsistency of both views can actually be reconciled with a more detailed 
analysis from information theory. 
 
The above analysis shows that securities often experience cycles of underreaction and 
overreaction as the result of investors’ information processing. What determine the level 
of underreaction and overreaction? It depends on how much we understand the 
fundamentals.  If the fundamentals are easy to understand by many people, both initial 
underreaction and eventual overreaction will be small. If the fundamentals are difficult to 
understand, mispricing can be substantial. We can have a look at glamour stocks. 
Glamour stocks are from companies with high earning growth. This means they have 
very few potent competitors, which generally indicates the lack of deep understanding 
about the particular products or production systems. That is to say, there is a high level of 
information asymmetry between the companies of glamour stocks and the general public. 
Initially, these types of companies are underpriced because few people understand them. 
However, the solid earning growth of these companies makes the share prices grow 
continuously, generating clear technical signals. The clarity of technical signals and 
vagueness of fundamental information will eventually cause high level of overreaction. 
Statistical results show that stocks undergoing price momentum over longer period will 
exhibit higher level of reversal. (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, Table I)  Economy wide, 
great speculative bubbles are generally associated with “new era” or “new economy”, 
when the general public is touched by the profound influence of technology 
breakthroughs while having little understanding of the underlying mechanisms. (Shiller, 
2000)  
 
In the following, we will answer the three questions posed by Lee and Swaminathan at 
the end of their paper. 
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“First, the asymmetry in the timing of momentum reversals between winners and losers 
remains a puzzle. We show that low volume losers rebound quickly and outperform high 
volume losers with the next three to 12 months. However, it takes low volume winners 
longer (more than 12 months) to significantly outperform high volume winner. We know 
of no explanation for this timing difference.” (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, p. 2067) 
 
From our analysis of information processing cycle, the low volume winner stage is the 
gradually understanding of fundamental news about a firm. Since the understanding of 
fundamentals is very costly and generally take very long time, it will take long time for 
low volume winners to significantly outperform high volume winners. The high volume 
loser stage is when large investors are already well informed about the overpricing and 
are active sellers. The price at this stage is supported by active buying of small investors, 
which mainly respond to popular media coverage and technical signals. (Hvidkjaer, 
2004) Since coverage from popular media and technical signals, which are information 
with low cost and low value, are easier to understand than details about fundamentals, the 
price adjustment at this stage is much faster.  
 
“Second, with the possible exception of the disposition effect from the behavioral 
literature, we know of no explanation for why trading volume should decline when firms 
fall out of favor.”  
 
The volume of trading reflects how many investors believe they can make profitable 
trades. When stocks are out of favor, few people believe they can make a profit buying 
these stocks. Hvidkjaer’s detailed analysis shows that losing stocks do experience 
consistent selling pressures over a long period of time. The low volume of trading when 
firms fall out of favor reflects one fundamental asymmetry in security trading. For a 
stock, there are always more potential buyers than potential sellers, who are largely 
existing share holders.  
 
“Finally, we find it remarkable that measures as readily available as past returns and 
trading volume can have such strong predictive power for returns. … Why this 
information is not fully reflected in current prices is another puzzle we leave for future 
research.” 
 
From (3), how much information we can understand depends on our background 
knowledge about the information and how much weight we assign to the information. 
From the efficient market theory, trading volume carries very little information. So little 
weight was given to the idea that trading volume might contain valuable information, 
which inhibited the research on this direction in the past.  
 
D. On equity premium 
 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) observed that the large size of risk premium on US equities 
can not be explained by the standard general equilibrium models and called it a puzzle. 
Among much research generated by this observation, two approaches are relevant to our 
study. One approach attributes the high risk premium to loss aversion by investors. 
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Barberis and Thaler (2003) provided a survey of works along this line. The other is 
survivorship bias proposed by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999).  
 
From the generalized entropy theory of information, how long a pattern persists depends 
on the cost of learning. It is often very costly to gain a deep understanding of a company 
or an industry, especially when the industry is new. The equity premium puzzle, 
however, is a very simple pattern on financial data, which, once discovered, can be 
understood very easily by the investment public. The strategy of profiting from the high 
equity premium is easy to implement and of low risk. This indicates that the pattern of 
high equity premium, if it does exist, is a short term one.  
 
Whether high equity premium is a pattern or a result of selection bias can be answered by 
more comprehensive data. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) documented that among all the 
equity markets around the world in the past century, the US market had the highest 
return. They argued that US market had the highest return because US was the most 
successful economic system in the world in the last century. “For 1921 to 1996, U.S. 
equities had the highest real return of all countries, at 4.3 percent, versus a median of 0.8 
percent for other countries. The high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears 
to be the exception rather than the rule.” (Jorion and Goetzmann,1999, p. 953) Their 
conclusion is consistent with the generalized entropy theory of information.  
   
 
IV. The relation with other models of behavioral finance 
 
Recently, several behavioral models provide frameworks to interpret the short to 
intermediate term momentum and long term reversal of return. In this section, we will 
discuss the relation between the generalized entropy theory of information and these 
models. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) explain momentum in terms of 
both initial and delayed overreaction, while Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and 
Hong and stein (1999) explain momentum in terms of initial underreaction and followed 
by delayed overreaction.  
 
From the information theory, the absorbing of a new information is a gradual process, in 
which the equivocation gradually reduces. So stock prices generally undereact to new 
information initially, which is confirmed by empirical evidences (Hvidkjaer, 2001). This 
is consistent with the models of Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and stein (1999). In the 
following, we will make further analysis of these two models.  
 
Barberis et al. (1998) utilize the concept of conservatism to understand underreaction. 
Conservatism states that individuals update their beliefs slowly in the face of new 
information. This property is a natural result from formula (3). Barberis et al. (1998) 
attribute overreaction to representativeness heuristic. “People rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 
p.1124). Many investors don’t want to spend tremendous resource to research 
fundamentals. They rely on a limited number of heuristic principles, such as technical 
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signals and opinions from popular media, which reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values of stocks to simpler judgmental operations with low 
cost. As we analyzed in the last section, this reliance on simple heuristic principles leads 
to overreaction in the asset market.  
 
Hong and Stein’s (1999) results are built on three key assumptions. The first two 
assumptions are that traders are classified as “newswatchers” and “momentum traders” 
according to their information processing abilities. They commented that, “the constraints 
that we put on traders’ information-processing abilities are arguably not as well-
motivated by the experimental psychology literature as the biases in Barberis et al. (1998) 
or Daniel et al. (1998), and so may appear to be more ad hoc” (Hong and Stein, 1999, p. 
2145). These assumptions can actually be derived naturally from the entropy theory of 
information. Depending on the value of assets under management, different investors will 
choose different methods of information gathering with different costs. “Newswatchers” 
are large investors who are willing to pay a high cost to collect private information and to 
make a deep understanding of public information. “Momentum traders” are investors 
who spend less cost or effort on information gathering and rely mainly on easy to 
understand low cost information such as coverage from popular media and price 
momentum signals. Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutional 
investors buy on fundamental news while individual investors buy on price trends. The 
third assumption of Hong and Stein (1999) is that private information diffuses gradually 
across the newswatcher population. The gradual diffusion of private information means 
that the number of people who enjoy low level of equivocation on some information 
gradually increases.  
 
Both the reduction of equivocation of a representative investor and the increase of 
number of investors who have low level of equivocation on information contribute to the 
gradual reduction of underreaction, which generates momentum. Both representativeness 
heuristic and “momentum trader” can generate overreaction, which will lead to eventual 
reversal. The information theory can further distinguish the models of Barberis et al. 
(1998) and Hong and stein (1999). In Barberis et al. (1998), a representative investor 
make trading decisions. In Hong and stein (1999, 2003), investors are heterogeneous. 
Investor heterogeneity can be understood naturally because of the different background 
of the investors and different cost that different investors are willing to pay to gather 
information. Empirical evidences show that investor heterogeneity exists in financial 
markets and plays an important role in the formation of trading patterns (Hvidkjaer, 
2001). 
 
From (3), the understanding of information depends on the background knowledge. 
Investors take longer time to understand information from sources they are less familiar 
with. Hong, Lim and Stein (2001) empirically confirm that information from small firms, 
from firms with low analyst coverage and from firms with bad news, which managers are 
reluctant to release, generally diffuse slower. From Hvidkjaer (2001), the selling 
pressures on loser generally are stronger and last much longer than buying pressures on 
winners, suggesting information processing is less efficient on bad news.  
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After discussing the existing behavioral models, Lee and Swaminathan summarized, 
“existing theories of investor behavior do not fully account for all of the evidence. … 
none of these models incorporate trading volume explicitly and, therefore, they cannot 
fully explain why trading volume is able to predict the magnitude and persistence of 
future price momentum” (Lee and Swaminathan, 2000, p. 2066). Trading volume, on the 
other hand, is an integral part of the model of investment behavior based on the 
generalized entropy theory of information.  This model answers many questions on the 
gaps between existing theories and empirical evidences.  
 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Barberis and Thaler(2002) commented that, “models typically capture something about 
investors’ beliefs, or their preferences, or the limits of arbitrage, but not all three.” In this 
work, we show that all three can be understood from the law of statistical physics and 
evolutionary adaptation. People’s belief systems are evolved to process information 
efficiently. People’s preferences are evolved to increase the chance of survival in the 
environment of our evolutionary past. Arbitrage is limited by the cost of information, 
which is in general an increasing function of the value of the information.  We show that 
this information theory based model of investor behavior captures the detailed patterns in 
asset market. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1: Information value and probability 
 
Figure 2: Overnight rate of return and trading volume of WestJet stock    
     surrounding the date when Jetsgo announced bankruptcy 
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